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V.aMpos  presents measures with which to map institution  In terms of effects on per capita income and school
l,Liinding  during the transition from centrally planned to  enrolltment, Campos finds the rule of law tco  be the mnost
mvarket  econo-a-ies.  Data collection and indicators are  important institutional dimension, both for the sample as
ncas  lred  in terms of five institutional dimensions of  a wNhole  and for differences between the two regions.
governance:  In tern-ms  of life expectancy, however, the quality of the
A  Accountability of the executive  bureaucracy plays the most crucial role.
•  Quatity of thie bureaucracy  One i,mportant mnessage  Campos draws from the
Rule  of law  results is that institutions  do change over time and are bh
Character of policy-making process  no rnearns as immotable as the literature has suggested.
Strength  of civil socicty.  The  range of feasible  policy  choices  (for  changing
Caampos  highlights -he differences over time and  institutions) may be much w-ider  than is often assumed.
b-etwveen  Central and Eastern European countries and
those  of the former Soviet Union.
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In  recent  years,  significant progresses have  been  made  in  the
economic analysis of institutional change. Chiefly among them is
the  recognition that  institutions are much  more malleable  than
initially  thought. 1 Although the  institutional framework in the
developed world indeed  does change  very slowly over time, the same
holds  not  with  respect  to  the  experiences  of  developing  and
transition  countries  (Lin  and Nugent, 1995). These countries are
still in search of an institutional  matrix that effectively solves
problems of "social conflict  management" (Rodrik,  1997) or, from a
different perspective, they are  still trying to find their ways
toward a "worked-out and generally accepted framework of property
rights"  (Solow,  1997).  That  institutions matter  for  economic
growth and development is -and always was- hardly controversial,
but  recent  research  is  starting to  point  to  answers  to  which
institutions matter, and why and how this is so.
If institutions encompass the players and the rules of the
game and if they evolve with detectable speed, then what is now
taking place in the former communist economies presents a unique
opportunity:  the  chance  to  observe  large-scale  institutional
change  (Dewatripont and Roland, 1997). This opportunity would be
missed  without efforts to  identify the  crucial elements of the
"institutional matrix," to propose empirical measures that reflect
1 The  empirical  literature  on  the  economic  impact  of  institutions  has  draw  much
comfort  from  the  proposition  that  institutions  do  not  change,  or  that  they
change  so  slowly  that  cross-sectional  data  provides  an  appropriate
representation.  Campos  and  Nugent  (1999)  critically  assess  this  proposition.
Aron  (1998)  surveys  this  literature  to  find  only  one  panel  data  study.  For
empirical  studies  of  the  impact  of  institutions  in  transition,  see  Adelman  and
Vujovic  (1998),  Brunetti,  Kisunko  and  Weder  (1997),  Dethier,  Ghanem  and  Zoli
(1999), and  Moers  (1999).
2their  evolution  over  time  and  across  countries,  and  to  evaluate
whether  (at least)  some of them have detectable  effects  on various
dimensions  of  development  performance.  Today  it  is  possible  to
tell  which  countries  have  progressed  further  in  the  transition
towards  a market  economy  (EBRD, various  years),  but  we  are  still
unable  to  identify  among  the  elements  inside  the  "institutional
black  box"  which  ones  played  prominent  roles  and  why.  For  many
social  sciences,  the transition  experience  is unique  and valuable.
For  institutional  economics,  it is vital.  Ecbnomists  that  believe
that  institutions  are  central  must  work  hard  to put  forward  a set
of indicators  that,  as a group,  is able to identify  differences  in
the national  processes  of institutional  change  and to distil  their
implications  in terms  of the various  development  experiences.
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  assemble  a  set  of
indicators  to allow  a first mapping  cf institutional  change  during
the  transition  from  centrally  planned  to  a  market  economy.2 The
concept  of governance  and  its five in,stitutional dimensions  (World
Bank,  1994)  provide  the basis  for the data  collection  effort.  The
paper  details  the  construction  of  a  panel  set  of  yearly  data
covering  25  Central  and  Eastern  European  and  former  Soviet  Union
countries  from  1989  to  1997.3 To  evaluate  the  goodness  of  these
constructed  measures  ofE  the  institutional  dimensions  of
governance,  the  paper  assess  their  ability  to  differentiate
2  Notice  that  the  disregard  for  institutional  reform  at  the  outset  of  the
transition is being  reversed: contrast for example Blanchard et al.  (1991,  pp.
xxi-xxii) to Stiglitz (1999).  See also Burki and Perry (1998)  and North (1997).
3  The study focuses on the following countries: Albania, Armenia,  Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech Republic, Estonia,  FYR  Macedonia,  Georgia,
Hungary,  Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Moldova,  Poland,  Romania,
Russian  Federation,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
3development  performance  across  transition  economies  over  time.
Development performance  is measured  by  real per  capita  income
(levels and  growth  rates), life expectancy at birth  and  school
enrolment  rates.  Therefore,  this  paper  offers  answers  to  the
following three  questions:  (a) To what extent  can the  relevant
institutional  dimensions  be  measured  in  terms  of  the  data
available  for  transition  economies?  (b) To  what  extent  do  the
resulting measurements  of  these  relevant  dimensions  vary  among
these  countries and  over  time? And  (c) To  what  extent  do  the
differences in these dimensions, across countries and over time,
help explain variations in economic  development  performance?
It is important to note that these objectives exclude, inter
alia,  an  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  institutional
building and  liberalization, stabilization and privatization. 4 It
will be only after data sets similar to the one constructed for
this paper are judged satisfactory that this will become a natural
(and arguably the most important) extension. Nonetheless, it is
important to note that the argument that the institutional vacuum
that  followed  the  fall  of  socialism  is  at  the  root  of  the
successes and  failures in economic reform has already been made.
For instance, Boone and Horder relate the institutional  vacuum to
the inflation problems experienced by the transition countries in
the early 1990s: `[the breakdown of the one-party system] meant
4  This  is a  trivial issue under the assumption that government policies are
directly  related  to  institutional success  or  failure.  The  new  institutional
economics has emphasized that the relationship  between policies and institutions
is much more intricate than previously thought (Nugent, 1998, and Campos, Khan
and  Tessendorf,  1999). See  Aslund  (1999) for  an  analysis  of  the  transition
failure in Russia in terms of the relationship  between policies and institutions
-(rapid elimination of  government-induced distortions followed by  complete and
open inattention to institutional reform).
4that many  of the checks and balances on political decision were
lost...  In the vacuum that followed  the political breakdown, the old
elites and rent seekers captured the political initiative in these
countries. To sustain their powers, and  sequester incomes, they
issued credits and maintained  distortionary policies  and,  as  a
result, acquired enormous assets" (1998,  p.43).
The major conclusion is that the panel data set constructed
for this paper  seems to allow a  good mapping of -the  process of
institution  building  and  is  quite  able  to  highlight  important
differences over time and between Central and Eastern European and
former Soviet Union countries.  The ruLle  of law is found to be the
most important institutional dimension of governance  (in  terms of
its effects on per capita income and school enrolment), both for
the sample as a whole and for differentiating Central and Eastern
European  from  former Soviet Union  countries. However, vis-a-vis
life  expectancy,  the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy  plays  a  more
important role than other institutional  dimensions.
The  organization of  the  paper  is  as  follows:  Section  2
distils the hypothesized links among the institutional dimensions
of  governance  and  between  them  and  the  various  indicators  of
development performance. Section 3 icdentifies  the data sources for
constructing measures of the different governance characteristics
and  summarizes these differences across countries and over time.
Section  4  investigates  whether  dif-ferences  in  the  constructed
indicators  of  the  institutional  dimensions  of  governance  are
significant  with  respect  to  various  aspects  of  development
performance. Section 5 concludes.
52. DEFINING  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  DIMENSIONS  OF GOVERNANCE
"Governance"  is  the  central  concept  for  this  study. 5 Although
there are many definitions available, the World Bank (1994,  1996,
1997)  seems  to  have  gone  further  in  operationalizing  it. 6
Governance  is  thought of as having  five  critical institutional
dimensions:  (1) the executive, (2) the bureaucracy, (3) the rule
of law,  (4) the character of the policy-making process, and  (5)
civil  society. Corresponding to each one of these  institutional
dimensions is a characteristic  associated with "good governance."
The executive branch of government (la) should be accountable for
its actions. The quality of the bureaucracy  (2a) should be high
("imbued  with a professional ethos") such that it is efficient and
capable of adjusting to changing social  needs. The legal framework
should  be  appropriate  to  the  circumstances  and  command  broad
consensus  (3a). The  policy-making process  should  be  open  and
transparent so that all affected groups may have inputs into the
decisions to be made  (4a). And civil society should be strong so
as  to  enable  it  to  participate  in  public  affairs  (5a). The
quantitative  indicators  that  are  found  to  reflect  these  five
dimensions  form the basis of the data  set constructed for this
paper.
There are, however, four observations that should be made up
front.  First,  the  notion  that  these  five dimensions  should be
jointly satisfied implies that the different characteristics are
5  This  section  draws  upon  Campos  and Nugent  (1999).
6  Tox  conceptual  discussions  of governance  see  Streeten  (1996),  Dethier  (1999)
and  International  Monetary  Fund  (1997).  Examples  of  (cross-sectional)  empirical
studies  on  the  issue  are  Olson,  Sarna  and  Swamy  (1997)  and  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and
Zoido-Libaton  (1999).
6thought  of  as  complements  to  one  another.  Satisfying  any  one
dimension  raises  the  probability  that  another  will  be  satisfied
and/or  its effect  on development  performance  will  be raised.
Second,  all  five  components  are  multi-dimensional.  For
example,  regarding  the  rule  of  law,  there  are  dimensions  which
relate  to the  public  sector  and  others  pertaining  to  the  private
sector  and  for  each  there  are  juridical,  legislative,  executive,
enforcement  and  acceptability  issues,  which  may  involve
perceptions  of  fairness  and  compatibility  with  informal  social
norms.
Third,  the  fact  that  several  dimensions  may  be  involved  in
any  single  institutional  component  and  that  no  less  than  five
different  characteristics  are  the  basis  for  the  notion  of
governance  implies  that  this  latter  concept  is  exceptionally
comprehensive.
Fourth  and  finally,  although  these  characteristics  are
institutionalized  (i.e.,  are  derived  from  institutions,  their
rules  and  how  well  they  work),  their  relevance  for  development
performance  depend  on  the  degree  to  which  a  given  country's
governance  characteristics  can  be  changed  over  time.  While
improvements  in governance  may  be reinforcing,  institutional  decay
and  loss of capacity  may  also ensue when  the governance  conditions
in a country  become  adverse.
Thus  far,  analyses  of  the  effects  of  governance
characteristics  have  taken  quite  different  forms.  Some,  e.g.,
Pritchett,  Isham and  Kaufmann  (1996), have  investigated  the  issue
in  detailed  micro-level  studies.  COthers have  investigated  the
7effects at the macroeconomic level of a single characteristic of
governance at a time, e.g., the effect of bureaucratic quality on
the prospects for macroeconomic reform (Ball  and  Rausser, 1995).
Generally speaking, macro-level tests of the effects of these and
other  institutional characteristics on economic development have
been  almost  exclusively  limited  to  international  cross-section
studies. As  such, it is unclear that the  results obtained  from
such studies apply to individual countries over time. Indeed, it
is  the  potentially  dynamic  character  and  comprehensiveness of
governance characteristics  that give this concept such importance.
However,  for  the  reasons  just  discussed  the  various
characteristics have to be tested collectively and in a context in
which they may have changed considerably over time.
The  five  characteristics  of  good  governance  have  been
identified in (la) - (5a)  above. One important issue is to try to
relate these both to each other and to each indicator of economic
development  performance. As  suggested above,  the  relationships
among the various components of good governance are deemed by the
World Bank (1994)  to be complementary. For example, when  (2a) the
quality of bureaucracy (as  defined above) is high, the government
may  be  better  able  to  respond  to  the  changing  needs  of  its
citizenry. These needs can be better expressed when there is both
a  strong  civil  society  (5a)  and  the  executive  branch  is
accountable for its actions  (la)  . The relevance and strength of
both (la) and  (5a), in turn, are increased when the policy-making
process is characterized by a high degree of transparency, i.e.,
I  As noted  above,  this  has  been  the  case  in the Central  and  Eastern  European  and
former  Soviet  Union  countries  since  1989.
8governance characteristic  (4a) is fulfilled. The effects of all
the  other  governance  characteristics  would  be  undermined  if
neither the  public  nor private sectors behave according to  the
rule  of  law.  Without  transparency, narrow  interest  groups  may
impede desirable changes. Yet, with transparency,  civil society is
more likely to become involved in the policy-making debate. On the
other hand, the achievement  of transparency requires  pressures for
widespread participation from civil society. By the  same token,
without  transparency  of  the  policy--making  process,  even  well-
intentioned and  constructive efforts by  various groups will  be
less likely to know how to succeed, and hence less successful in
affecting  policy  and  governance characteristics  in  the  desired
direction. The executive arm of the government must be accountable
for  its actions if those actions are not  to be "captured" by  a
small, narrowly  defined interest group more  interested  in rent
seeking than in broadly based development.
One might suspect that some of the institutional dimensions
of  governance  would  have  stronger (effects  on  some elements  of
development performance than on others  (UNDP,  1995). For example,
(2a) and  (4a)  would seem to be most directly related to the level
of  income per  capita. On  the  other hand,  characteristics  (la),
(3a) and  (5a) might be  relatively more important in determining
life expectancy and school enrolment rates. If there would seem to
be  two  or  more  different  variables  primarily  responsible  for
determining any development performance indicator, the necessity
of pure complementarity among the governance characteristics  might
be questioned. Indeed, one could think of  (la) and  (4a) as being
9substitutes for  one  another,  (2a),  (3a) and  (5a) as  potential
substitutes for one another. Complementarity  would be between each
of these sets.  In the light of the previous discussion, strong
assertions of this type are risky without an empirical basis.
3. MEASURING  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  DIMENSIONS  OF GOVERNANCE
The measurement of the various characteristics  of governance is no
easy matter. For one thing, several of these characteristics are,
in  principle,  multi-dimensional.  To  do  justice  to  the  multi-
dimensionality  of  these  characteristics  implies  the  need  for
different measures for each dimension. Until  full-fledged sample
surveys designed specifically  to measure governance are developed,
studies will have to  utilize existing data  sets with  less than
ideal data for the purpose. Given the importance of such issues,
the investments in new data that have been made in recently, and
the costs of collecting additional data, it is imperative to take
stock  of  the  available data,  use  it  to  determine  whether  the
hypotheses have merit and, if so, whether further investments in
data collection are indeed desirable.
The purpose of this section is to identify available data
that may be relevant to each of the  institutional dimensions of
governance  (la)-(5a), as discussed above. Three  observations are
necessary.  First,  all  variables  were  transformed  from  their
original  scale  to  one  from  0  to  10,  and  were  inverted  (when
needed)  to  have  higher  scores  reflecting  better  institutional
performance. Second, after  assembling the  largest possible  data
set  of  institutional  indicators,  coverage  was  found  to  be
10unbalanced,  that  is,  much  better  for  characteristics  (2a),  (3a)
and  (5a)  . Consequently,  the  transparency  of  the  policy-making
process  and  the  accountability  of  the  executive  were  merged  in  a
single  characteristic.  Third,  the  country  and  time  coverage  from
all  different  sources  varies  quite  a  lot,  so  interpolations  need
to  be  performed.  These  were  supported  by  Banks  (various  years),
Gwartney,  Lawson  and  Block(1996),  Holmes,  Johnson  and  Kirkpatrick
(1997,  1998)  Karatnycky,  Motyl  and  Shor  (1998),  Messick  (1996),
and Taylor  and Jodice  (1993).
Let  start  describing  the  indicators  used  as  the  basis  for
the  measure  of  characteristic  (2a),  the  quality  of  the
bureaucracy.  This  was  constructed  orn  the  basis  of  two  existing
indicators.  The  first,  available  from  the  International  Country
Risk  Guide  (ICRG),  is  called  "bureaucratic  quality"  and  captures
the  extent  to which  the national  bureaucracy  enjoys  autonomy  from
political  pressure,  has the  strength  and  expertise  to govern  in a
stable  manner  without  drastic  changes  in  policy,  and  has  an
effective  mechanism  for  recruiting  and  training.  The  second  such
indicator,  from  Holmes,  Johnson  and  Kirkpatrick  (1997,  1998)  is
their  "factor  #9,  regulation."  It measures,  on  a  1-5  scale,  the
extent  of  licensing  requirements  to  operate  a business,  the  ease
to  obtain  a  business  license,  the  corruption  within  the
bureaucracy,  and  the  extent  and  nature  of  labor,  environmental,
consumer  safety,  and worker  health  regulations.
Characteristic  (3a), the rule  of law,  was  constructed  on the
basis  of  three  indicators,  the  first  two  focusing  on  enforcement
and  the  latter  on the type  and  substance  of the  "law"  itself.  The
11first  is  again  an  ICRG  indicator  ("rule  of  law  tradition")
reflecting  the  country-specific degree  to  which  citizens  are
willing  to  accept  the  established institutions for  making  and
implementing  laws  and  adjudicating disputes.  Higher  scores  of
"rule  of  law"  indicate  that  the  country  has  sound  political
institutions and a strong court system. The second such indicator,
from Holmes, Johnson and Kirkpatrick (1997,  1998) is their "factor
#8, property rights." It measures, on a 1-5 scale, the government
influence over the judicial system, the commercial code defining
contracts,  the  sanctioning  of  foreign  arbitration  of  contract
disputes,  corruption  within  the  judiciary,  delays  in  judicial
decisions, and the extent of legally granted and protected private
property. Notice that this indicator also takes into account the
risk of expropriation, but as individual scores are not provided,
it  is  impossible  to  purge  it  from  this  measure.8 The  third
indicator upon which this measure is based is "rule of law" from
Karatnycky, Motyl and Shor (1998)  . It measures on a 1 to 7 scale
whether a post-communist constitution  has been adopted, whether it
does provide for property and human rights, whether the criminal
code has been subject to reform, whether judges rule fairly and
impartially and whether they were appointed during the communist
era, whether the courts are free of political control, whether the
state provide public defenders, and whether ethnic  minority rights
are protected.
a  This  is  a  problem  because  an  indicator  for  risk  of  expropriation  from  a
different source was used as a component in another characteristic,  as discussed
below.
12In the case of  (5a), the  strength of civil  society, three
indicators  were  identified  to  depict  some  of  the  necessary
conditions under which  a strong civil society might  emerge. The
first two indicators are from Gastil  (now Freedom House), civil
liberties9  and political rights.1 0 Notice that although these are
quite  comprehensive  indicators,  individual  scores  are  not
provided."  The  third  is  the  "civil  society"  indicator  from
Karatnycky, Motyl and Shor (1998)  . The latter reflects the degree
to  which  volunteerism,  trade  unionism,  and  professional
associations  exist,  and  whether  civic  organizations  are
influential.
9The  indicator for "civil liberties" addresses the following issues: Are there
free and independent  media, literature and other cultural expressions? Is there
open public discussion and free  private discussion? Is there freedom of assembly
and  demonstration?  Is  there  freedom  of  political  or  quasi-political
organization? Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent,
nondiscriminatory judiciary, and are they  respected by the security forces? Is
there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile
or  torture, whether by groups  that support or oppose  the system, and  freedom
from  war  or  insurgency  situations? Are  there  free  trade  unions  and  peasant
organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are
there  free  professional  and  other  private  organizations?  Are  there  free
businesses  or  cooperatives?  Are  there  free  religious  institutions  and  free
private  and public  religious expressions? Are  there personal  social freedoms,
which  include  such  aspects as  gender  equality,  property  rights,  freedom  of
movement,  choice of residence, and choice of marriage and  size of family?  Is
there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type
of  denigrating  obstacle  to  a  share of  legitimate  economic  gains?  Is  there
freedom from extreme government  indifference  and corruption?
0  The "political rights" indicator is constructed on the basis of the following
questions:  Is  the  head  of  state  and/or  head  of  government  or  other  chief
authority  elected  through  free  and  fair  elections?  Are  the  legislative
representatives  elected  through  free  and  fair  elections?  Are  there  fair
electoral  laws?  Are  the  voters  able  to  endow  their  freely  elected
representatives  with real power? Do the people have the right to freely organize
in different political parties or other competitive  political groupings of their
choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties
or groupings? Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power,
and a  realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain
power-through  elections? Are the people  free from domination by the military,
foreign  powers,  totalitarian  parties,  religious  hierarchies,  economic
oligarchies or  any  other powerful  groups? Do cultural,  ethnic, religious  and
other  minority  groups  have  reasonable  self-determination,  self-government,
autonomy  or  participation  through  informal  consensus  in  the  decision-making
process?
11  This  is a problem because an indicator of "independent media" was used  as a
component in another characteristic,  as discussed  below.
13As  noted  before,  in  contrast  to  these  first  three
institutional  characteristics,  for  the  "transparency  of  the
policy-making  process"  and  "accountability  of  the  executive"
(characteristics  la  and  4a)  there  is  considerably  greater
difficulty  in  identifying  suitable  indicators.  In  order  to
circumvent these difficulties,  the two characteristics  were merged
("accountability  and transparency") and the following four series
were used to construct the relevant indicator. From  Karatnycky,
Motyl and Shor (1998),  "political  process" and "independent  media"
were  used. The  former reflects, on a  1 to 7  scale,  elections,
referenda,  party  configuration,  conditions  for  political
competition, and  popular  participation in  elections.  Using  the
same scale, "independent  media" assesses the freedom of the press,
public access to various information sources, and the independence
of those sources from undue government or other influences. The
other two indicators  (from ICRG) capture the  risk of government
repudiation  of  contracts  and  the  risk  of  expropriation,
respectively.
Table 1 contains the description of all the variables used
in the  analysis. Table  2  shows basic  .statistics  for  the whole
sample,  as well  as  for  two  important sub-samples, Central  and
Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries  (the  Baltics  included)  and
countries  that  are  members  of  the  Commonwealth of  Independent
States (CIS).
The  crucial  issue  is  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  the
institutional characteristics of  governance are  captured by  the
panel data set constructed for this paper. The relevance of this
14exercise is given by the hypothesis that these five institutional
characteristics  are  complements  to,  not  substitutes  for,  each
other. To start dealing with this issue, the pair-wise correlation
coefficients are examined. A  low and statistically insignificant
correlation  will suggest that the two underlying variables capture
different institutional characteristics of governance, and vice-
versa,  a  high  and  statistically significant  correlation  would
suggest  that  the  two  underlying  variables  capture  the  same
institutional  characteristics  of  governance.  The  pair-wise
correlation coefficients are  given  in Table  3.  Because  of  the
ordinal  character  of  these  institutional  indicators,  Spearman
(rank)  correlations were deemed  more appropriate.
There  are  a  number  of  salient  issues.  The  pair-wise
correlations for the whole sample are somewhat high, ranging from
0.61 between civil society and quality of the bureaucracy to 0.72
between  civil  society  and  "accountability  and  transparency."
Notice also that the  correlations between all  four institutional
measures and the CIS dummy are negative. Closer examination for
the two sub-samples reveals that the correlation coefficients are
much lower, but the one between civil society and "accountability
and  transparency"  is  still  the  largest.  For  the  Central  and
Eastern European countries,  the lowest correlation  is that between
the quality of the bureaucracy  and the rule of law, while that for
the  CIS  countries  it  is  the  one  between  the  rule  of  law  and
"accountability and transparency."  The fact that breaking down the
sample significantly lowers the correlation coefficients suggests
that the data set capture different aspects of the institutional
15matrix. This judgement is reinforced by noting that these pair-
wise  correlation  coefficients  are  even  lower  when  the  time
dimension is controlled for  (i.e., examining these  coefficients
for each sub-sample in each year, at the cost of much lower number
of  observations).  In  order  to  evaluate  the  goodness  of  these
constructed  measures  of  the  institutional  dimensions  of
governance, next we assess whether they are able to differentiate
development  performance across transition economies over time.
4. ASSESSING  THE  PROPOSED MEASUREMENT  OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS  OF GOVERNANCE
Having  constructed  a  set  of  four  factors  (or  groups  of
institutional characteristics  of governance), the next question is
whether  the  differences  they  capture  are  (statistically)
significant  in explaining development performance over time and
across  transition  countries.  When  development  performance  is
proxied by per capita income, economic growth, life expectancy at
birth and secondary school enrolment rates.
Before discussing the empirical results, it is important to
issue  some  additional words of  caution. First, the  analysis  is
exploratory  in  that  there  is no  formal theoretical model  from
which  the  findings  can  be  checked  against.  And  second,  the
institutions of governance are assumed to be exogenous to each of
the development performance indicators,  thereby justifying the use
of the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The  first  set  of  results-  is  shown  in  Table  4.  For  the
complete  sample,  and  the  CEE  and  CIS  sub-samples, it  reports
parameter  estimates,  their  standard  errors, their  t-ratios  and
16associated p-values, from OLS regressions of the average level of
per  capita  GDP  on  the  set  of  four  institutional  indicators.' 2
Altogether,  the  set  of  governance  characteristics  captures  a
satisfactory proportion of the  intra-regional differences in the
level of per capita GDP over time. For the complete sample, three
out  of  the  four  institutional  indicators  are  statistically
significant  and  have  the  correct  sign  (recall  that  all
institutional indicators were  normalized and  re-scaled so as  to
justify the expectation of a positive effect of each institutional
characteristic on the various development  performance indicators).
The  only one  that does not perform well is "accountability and
transparency." Breaking down the sample into CIS and CEE brings a
number of differences to light. For the CEE countries, only rule
of law and civic society are statistically significant  (at the 5
percent level), while the most important factors with respect to
differences among CIS countries are the quality of the bureaucracy
and rule of law.
Table 5 contains the results of similar regressions  when the
dependent variable is the growth of income per capita, instead of
its  level.  It  is  remarkable  that  rule  of  law  is  the  only
statistically significant institutional dimension  of governance.
Moreover,  none  of  the  four perform  satisfactorily  for  the  CEE
countries, while only one  (the quality of the bureaucracy) is not
statistically  significant for the CIG sub-sample.
12  The  reader  should  bear  in mind  that  all  regressions  are  run with  year  dummies
to  purge  the  "time  effect"  out  of  a  "pure  institutional  effect."  These
coefficients  are  not  shown  for the  sake  of space.
17With respect to life expectancy at birth, as shown in Table
6, the institutional  indicators  capture a rather low proportion of
the intra-regional differences. Not surprisingly, the quality of
the  bureaucracy  is  the  only  indicator  showing  statistical
significance (which  is also true for the CEE sample). Notice that
the "accountability and transparency" dimension is statistically
significant but, surprisingly, carries a negative sign.  For the
CIS  countries,  none  of  the  coefficients  is  statistically
significant at the 5 percent level.
Finally,  as  shown  in  Table  7,  the  over  time  and  cross-
country variation in the last measure of development performance,
secondary school enrolment rates, is better explained for the CIS
than  for  the  pooled  sample  as  all  relevant  coefficients  are
significant in the former.  While civil society and the rule of law
show a positive impact, the opposite can be seen for the quality
of  the  bureaucracy  and  for  "accountability  and  transparency."
Although for the CEE countries, "accountability and transparency"
is the only coefficient  that is not statistically significant,  the
sign pattern from the whole sample for the other three dimensions
is  repeated.  Once  again,  for  the  CIS  countries,  none  of  the
coefficients  is  statistically  significant  (at  the  5  percent
level).
In light  of these  results, the data  set put  together  for
this paper seems to perform quite reasonably. Yet, one concern is
the  possibility  that  this  performance  is  driven  by
multicollinearity  or  by  the  aforementioned  complementarity  or
substitutability between the  different  institutional dimensions
18vis-a-vis  each  development  performance  indicator.  The  method
chosen  to  investigate  this  issue  was  to  enlarge  the  previous
specifications with the set of six possible interaction  terms. And
then evaluate the significance  and sign of the coefficients of the
interaction terms  in order to assess whether any given  pair of
institutional  characteristics are  complements to  or  substitutes
for each  other  (vis-a-vis  the development  performance  indicator  in
question).
Table  8  reports  the  parameter  estimates,  their  standard
errors,  their  t-ratios  and  p-values,  from  OLS  regressions  of  the
average  level  of  per  capita  GDP  on  both  the  set  of  four
institutional  indicators  and  the  set  of  six  interaction  terms.
Compared  to  the  results  in  Table  4,  all  coefficients  loose
statistical  significance,  for  the  complete  sample.  On  the  other
hand,  clearer  pictures  emerge  for the  two  sub-samples.  Among  CEE
countries,  the  coefficient  on  the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy  is
negative  and  significant after  taking  into  account that  it  is
complementary  to  "accountability  and  transparency"  and  that  the
coefficient  on the interaction  term between  civil  society  and rule
of  law  (the  two  other  significant  resUlts  in  the  regression  in
Table  4)  is  positive,  suggesting  conplementarity  between  them.
Similar  results  obtain  for  the  CIS  countries.  The  quality  of  the
bureaucracy  seems  to  have  an  important  positive  impact,  and  the
same  holds  for  the  interaction  between  rule  of  law  and
"accountability  and transparency."
The  results  for  economic  growth  improve  after  controlling
for the  interaction  terms  (table 9)  . Notice  that  the  role  of  rule
19of law  (prominent  in the results in Table 5) is now replaced by a
relationship  of  substitutability  between  this  institutional
dimension  and  the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy.  Moreover,
"accountability  and  transparency"  now  gains  statistical
significant  but  carries  a  negative  sign.  While  without  the
interaction  terms  there  were  no  statistically  significant
coefficients for the CEE  sample, adding interaction terms makes
many of them so. Cases in point are civil society, rule of law and
"accountability and  transparency"  (note however  that  the  first
shows a positive impact  while the last two show negative effects).
Moreover,  these obtain with some significant interaction terms:
civil  society  and  the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy  and
"accountability and transparency"  and rule of law seem to be (both
pairs)  complements, and  civil  society  and  "accountability  and
transparency" seem  substitutes  (vis-a-vis economic  growth)  . For
the  CIS  sample,  civil  society  and  "accountability  and
transparency" remain statistically significant and carry the same
signs as before. As for the interaction  terms, rule of law and the
quality of the bureaucracy are taken to be substitutes, while the
quality of the bureaucracy and "accountability and transparency"
are taken to be complements.
Table  10  shows  the  results for  life  expectancy  at  birth
enlarged by the set of interactions  terms. Although previously for
the  whole  sample  (table 6) only the quality of the bureaucracy
showed a significant impact, now only civil society does so. As
for the interaction terms, note that civil society and rule of law
seem complements vis-a-vis life expectancy, while  civil  society
20and  "accountability  and transparency"  are taken  to be substitutes.
The  negative  impact  of  "accountability  and  transparency"  for  the
CEE countries  remains,  but  the coefficient  on civil  society  is now
statistically  significant  and  positive.  In  addition  to  the  two
significant  interaction  terms  for the whole  sample,  for the CEE  it
also  obtains  that  the quality  of  the bureaucracy  and  rule  of  law
are  substitutes  while  the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy  and
"accountability  and  transparency"  are  complements.  The  major
change  for the CIS  is that  the coefficient  on "accountability  and
transparency"  is  now  statistically  significant  and  positive.
Furthermore,  this  dimension  is  found  to  be  a  substitute  for  the
rule  of law.
Finally,  table  11 shows  the  results  for  the  gross  secondary
school  enrolment  rates.  Despite  the  substantial  improvements  in
adjusted  R2 (compared  to table  7), many  results  diverge.  While  all
dimensions  were  previously  statistically  significant  for the whole
sample,  now  only  "accountability  and transparency"  and rule of law
remain  so, but  both  coefficients  carry  negative  signs.  Moreover,
the  quality  of  the  bureaucracy  and  civil  society  and  (not
surprisingly)  "accountability  and  transparency"  and  rule  of  law
are  complements.  Notice  also  that  with  the  addition  of  the
interaction  terms,  there  are  no  statistically  significant
coefficients  left  for  the  CEE  sample.  For  the  CIS  countries,  the
only  important  finding  is  that  civil  society  and  the  quality  of
the bureaucracy  are  complements.
Time  is  ripe  for  a  summary.  After  accounting  for  the
possibility  of  interactions  between  the  four  institutional
21dimensions of governance, for the complete sample the rule of law
is  found to  be  the most  important institutional dimension  (in
terms of its effects on per capita income and school enrolment),
both  for  the  sample  as  a  whole  and  for  its  capacity  to
differentiate  Central  and  Eastern  European  from  former  Soviet
Union  countries. Yet, vis-a-vis life expectancy, the  quality of
the bureaucracy  plays the crucial role.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this paper was to put forward a set of measures
to  allow  a  first mapping  of  institutional building  during  the
transition from centrally  planned to a market economy. It used the
concept of governance to guide the data collection and indicator
construction efforts.  The  panel  data  set  constructed  for  this
paper does seem to allow a mapping of the process of institution
building, and seems able to highlight differences in this respect
over  time  and  between Central and  Eastern European  and  former
Soviet Union countries. The rule of law is found to be the most
important institutional dimension (in terms of its effects on per
capita  income and  school enrolment), both  for  the  sample as  a
whole  and  for its  capacity to differentiate Central and Eastern
European  from the  former Soviet Union  countries. However,  with
respect to life expectancy, the quality of the bureaucracy plays
the crucial role.
A  crucial  suggestion  for  future research  is  that  further
improvement of the measures used for the institutional dimensions
of governance is needed. Although accountability of the executive
22and the transparency of the decision-making  process should receive
priority,  these  efforts  should  not  disregard  the  other  three
indicators. Moreover, the four constructed  measures should be put
to test by other researchers  to provide an independent assessment
of their goodness and applicability.
Finally, one  important message  from these  results is that
institutions do  change  over time.  In  contrast with  the  rather
pessimistic views  of  the path-depencdency  literature, this  is  a
more encouraging finding in that institutions are by no means as
immutable and unchangeable as that literature has suggested. This
implies  that  the  feasibility  space  for  policy  choices  (in
attempting to change institutions) may  be much wider than often
assumed.
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27Table  1.
Variables  description
Abbreviation  Variable  Source
CIS  Dummy  variable  for  country
belonging  to the Commonwealth
of Independent  States  (O if not)
GDPGROW  Growth  of per  capita  GDP  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
(annual,  %)
GDPPCPPP  Level  of per  capita  GDP  WDI CD-ROM  1999
(constant  1995  US$).
EOFEM  Life  expectancy  at birth,  female.  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
EOMALE  Life  expectancy  at birth,  male.  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
EOTOT  Life  expectancy  at birth,  total.  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
SEPRIM  Gross  primary  school  enrolment  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
rate.
SEPRFEM  Gross  female  primary  school  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
enrolment  rate.
SESEC  Gross  secondary  school  enrolment  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
rate.
SESECFEM  Gross  female  secondary  school  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
enrolment  rate.
SETER  Gross  tertiary  school  WDI  CD-ROM  1999
enrolment  rate.
CIVSOC  Strength  of  civil  society.  Author's  calculations
(see text)
BUROQUAL  Quality  of  the burocracy.  Author's  calculations
(see text)
RULELAW  Rule  of law.  Author's  calculations
(see text)
TRANSACC  Transparency  of policy-making  and  Author's  calculations





Variable  N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimurm  Maximum
CIS  225  0.4400000  0.4974937  0  1.0000000
GDPGROW  211  -4.4013138  10.2978242  -52.3000717  11.3866186
GDPPCPPP  205  4313.17  2187.80  980.0000000  11800.00
EOFEM  203  74.2266996  2.0438013  68.1999970  78.5999985
EOMALE  203  65.7713793  2.9084015  56.5000000  71.0000000
EOTOT  203  69.8959247  2.3054936  62.2072983  74.7072983
SEPRIM  169  96.1751479  8.7545823  76.0000000  122.0000000
SEPRFEM  152  95.8177631  8.9621582  76.0000000  129.0000000
SESEC  168  85.7886906  12.1950831  37.5000000  126.3000031
SESECFEM  152  85.8177634  12.9917502  37,7999992  130.3999939
SETER  178  27.4146068  11.0321824  6.9000001  56.5999985
CIVSOC  225  4.2000000  3.1755046  0  10.0000000
BUROQUAL  225  2.3227778  1.6056361  0.8333333  8.3333333
RULELAW  225  5.6600000  2.4919274  2.0000000  10.0000000
TRANSACC  225  6.7126667  1.7502314  3.0000000  9.5000000
Table  2a.
Basic  Statistics
(Central  and  Eastern  Europe  sample)
---------------------------------------------- _.-------------__-------
Variable  N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum
---------------------------------------------- _.-------------__-------
GDPGROW  117  -2.2033168  8.9758212  -34.8590050  11.3866186
GDPPCPPP  113  5164.87  2377.83  1490.00  11800.00
EOFEM  122  74.9263936  1.7052437  69.6999970  78.5999985
EOMALE  122  66.7231148  2.4911604  60.7000008  71.0000000
EOTOT  122  70.7247122  1.9003716  65.6537018  74.7072983
SEPRIM  103  96.4378641  6.3904206  81.5000000  111.9000015
SEPRFEM  98  95.5489796  6.3499209  8(.9000015  110.0000000
SEShEC  103  83.1514564  13.8758916  .37.5000000  126.3000031
SESECEEM  96  83.8500005  14.8489730  37.7999992  130.3999939
SETER  99  23.5909093  8.0525328  69.9000001  45.2000008
CTVSOC  126  5.5158730  3.1514673  0  10.0000000
BUROQUAL  126  3.1431878  1.6976577  0.8333333  8.3333333
RULELAW  126  6.9761905  2.3335766  .2.0000000  10.0000000
TRANSACC  126  7.9412698  0.9362068  4.5000000  9.5000000
Table  2b.
Basic  Statistics
(Commonwealth  of Independent  States  sample)
------------------------------------------------ _------------__-------
Variable  N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum
GDPGROW  94  -7.1371187  11.1948057  -52.3000717  11.0000000
GDPPCPPP  92  3267.07  1328.20  980.0000000  6230.00
EOFEM  81  73.1728395  2.0683338  68.1999970  77.3000031
TOMALE  81  64.3379010  2.9172217  56.5000000  70.3000031
ECTOT  81  68.6476275  2.3094683  62.2072983  73.7145996
SEPRIM  66  95.7651514  11.5641020  76.0000000  122.0000000
SEPRFEM  54  96.3055554  12.4364409  76.0000000  129.0000000
SESEC  65  89.9676923  7.2301475  74.0000000  102.0000000
SESECFEM  56  89.1910712  8.0124057  71.0000000  102.0000000
SETER  79  32.2063290  12.3654432  11.6999998  56.5999985
CIVSOC  99  2.5252525  2.3067440  0  6.6666667
BUROQUAL  99  1.2786195  0.4998812  0.8333333  2.7500000
RULELAW  99  3.9848485  1.4783876  2.0000000  7.0000000
TRAMNSACC  99  5.1489899  1.2137179  3.0000000  8.0000000
29Table  3.
Spearman  Correlation  Coefficients
(Complete  sample,  N =  225)
BUROQUAL  RULELAW  TRANSACC  CIS
CIVSOC  0.61829  0.69072  0.72986  -0.46502
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001
BUROQUAL  0.62007  0.69088  -0.64554
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001





Spearman  Correlation  Coefficients
(Central  and  Eastern  Europe  sample,  N  =  126)
BUROQUAL  RULELAW  TRANSACC
CIVSOC  0.45940  0.76578  0.69318
0.0001  0.0001  0.0001





Spearman  Correlation  Coefficients
(Commonwealth  of Independent  States  sample,  N  99)
BUROQUAL  RULELAW  TRANSACC
CIVSOC  0.42326  0.26779  0.69408
0.0001  0.0074  0.0001





Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regressions
Dependent  Variable:  GDPPCPPP
(Intercept  and  time  dummies  not  shown)
------------------------------------------------------ _.----------__---------__-
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for  HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  |Tt
CIVSOC  1  240.961680  77.64116403  3.104  0.0022
BUROQUAL  1  210.207119  92.89991186  2.263  0.0248
RULELAW  1  413.053699  77.86702329  5.305  0.0001
TRANSACC  1  -126.978467  115.26027889  -1.102  0.2720
Root  MSE  1583.88104  R-square  0.5067
Dep  Mean  4313.17073  Adj  R-sq  0.4759
C.V.  36.72196
Central  and Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=O  Prob  >  ITI
civSoc  1  316.585112  155.94767335  2.030  0.0450
BUROQUAL  1  164.747273  130.63032065  1.261  0.2102
RULELAW  1  422.075825  141.36568851  2.986  0.0036
TRANSACC  1  141.816235  302.23976611  0.469  0.6399
Root  MSE  1933.60230  R-square  0.4096
Dep Mean  5164.86726  Adj  R-sq  0.3387
C.V.  37.43760
Commonwealth  of  Independenl:  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  27.067688  75.42170508  0.359  0.7206
BUROQUAL  1  1152.302916  264.79306131  4.352  0.0001
RULELAW  1  356.652378  93.35148601  3.821  0.0003
TRANSACC  1  160.263935  134.98596113  1.187  0.2387
Root  MSE  892.28492  R-square  0.6082
Dep  Mean  3267.06522  Adj  R-sq  0.5487
C.V.  27.31151
31Table  5.
Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regressions
Dependent  Variable:  GDPGROW
(Intercept  and  time  dummies  not  shown)
------------------------------------------------------------------ __---------__
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
civsoc  1  0.368824  0.39258362  0.939  0.3486
BUROQUAL  1  0.459084  0.48010794  0.956  0.3401
RULELAW  1  0.807679  0.39043671  2.069  0.0399
TRANSACC  1  -0.174854  0.56614734  -0.309  0.7578
Root  MSE  8.10070  R-square  0.4166
Dep Mean  -4.40131  Adj  R-sq  0.3812
C.V.  -184.05181
------------------------------------------------------------- __--------------__
Central  and Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for  HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  iTi
CIVSOC  1  0.174485  0.54222789  0.322  0.7483
BUROQUAL  1  0.317669  0.46590716  0.682  0.4969
RULELAW  1  0.415261  0.48029448  0.865  0.3892
TRANSACC  1  0.771568  1.05465538  0.732  0.4661
Root MSE  6.96615  R-square  0.4600
Dep Mean  -2.20332  Adj  R-sq  0.3977
C.V.  -316.16644
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
civsoc  1  2.092719  0.63334424  3.304  0.0014
BUROQUAL  1  -2.396760  2.16518563  -1.107  0.2716
RULELAW  1  2.947646  0.75792461  3.889  0.0002
TRANSACC  1  -4.473516  1.10853564  -4.036  0.0001
Root  MSE  7.52697  R-square  0.6063
Dep Mean  -7.13712  Adj  R-sq  0.5479
C.V.  -105.46230
32Table  6.
Ordinary  Least  Squares  ]Regressions
Dependent  Variable:  EOTOT
(Intercept  and time  dummies  not  shown)
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
civsoc  1  0.117811  0.10159741  1.160  0.2477
BUROQUAL  1  0.435482  0.11793846  3.692  0.0003
RULELAW  1  0.049970  0.09804333  0.510  0.6109
TRANSACC  1  0.102834  0.13901708  0.740  0.4604
Root  MSE  2.06734  R-square  0.2437
Dep Mean  69.89592  Adj  R-sq  0.1959
C.V.  2.95774
Central  and Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CiVSOC  1  -0.082889  0.13101175  -0.633  0.5283
BUROQUAL  1  0.459984  0.11534914  3.988  0.0001
RULELAW  1  0.227293  0.11690799  1.944  0.0544
TRANSACC  1  -0.691499  0.26032716  -2.656  0.0091
Root  MSE  1.79167  R-square  0.1993
Dep Mean  70.72471  Adj  R-sq  0.1111
C.V.  2.53330
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Paralneter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CivSOC  1  0.145335  0.20150826  0.721  0.4732
BUROQUAL  1  -0.371514  0.71038103  -0.523  0.6027
RULELAW  1  -0.414527  0.22898403  -1.810  0.0747
TRANSACC  1  -0.048291  0.31667961  -0.152  0.8793
Root  MSE  2.23222  R-square  0.2059
Dep  Mean  68.64763  Adj R-sq  0.0658
C.V.  3.25171
33Table  7.
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
Dependent  Variable: SESEC
(Intercept  and time  dummies not shown)
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Paraaeter=0  Prob >  ITI
civsoC  1  2.026678  0.55497133  3.652  0.0004
BUROQUAL  1  -2.826511  0.68336776  -4.136  0.0001
RULELAW  1  1.679961  0.54337700  3.092  0.0024
TRANSACC  1  -3.353159  0.77717650  -4.315  0.0001
Root MSE  10.51511  R-square  0.3055
Dep Mean  85.78869  Adj R-sq  0.2565
C.V.  12.25699
Central and Eastern Europe sample
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > ITI
CIVSOC  1  2.377112  0.94515306  2.515  0.0137
BUROQUAL  1  -3.428571  0.89636168  -3.825  0.0002
RULELAW  1  1.797077  0.81421788  2.207  0.0298
TRANSACC  1  2.820369  2.07823949  1.357  0.1781
Root MSE  11.92846  R-square  0.3407
Dep Mean  83.15146  Adi R-sq  0.2610
C.V.  14.34546
Commonwealth of Independent  States sample
Parameter  Standard  T for H0:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=O  Prob >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  0.824202  0.47309343  1.742  0.0873
BUROQUAL  1  2.320143  1.73358869  1.338  0.1865
RULELAW  1  -0.044004  0.59808758  -0.074  0.9416
TRANSACC  1  -1.735857  0.93720034  -1.852  0.0696
Root  MSE  4.88173  R-square  0.6225
Dep Mean  89.96769  Adj R-sq  0.5441
C.V.  5.42609
34Table  8.
Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regressions  with  Interaction  Terms
Dependent  Variable:  (3DPPCPPP
(Intercept  and  time  dummies  not  shown)
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for  HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  IT[
CIVSOC  1  206.607154  279.98459566  0.738  0.4615
BUROQUAL  1  -745.781867  716.92897595  -1.040  0.2996
RULELAW  1  72.376273  404.76903844  0.179  0.8583
TRANSACC  1  27.954527  335.55211497  0.083  0.9337
CS BQ  1  51.057937  57.33713289  0.890  0.3744
CS RL  1  69.362877  35.93373928  1.930  0.0551
CS TR  1  -82.238853  53.73965266  -1.530  0.1276
BQ RL  1  -9.542072  62.56565209  -0.153  0.8789
BQITR  1  85.761578  110.93147244  0.773  0.4404
RL TR  1  11.885049  74.33617181  0.160  0.8731
Root  MSE  1539.28986  R-square  0.5487
Dep Mean  4313.17073  Adj  R-sq  0.5050
C.V.  35.68813
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  1372.674337  915.58889753  1.499  0.1372
BUROQUAL  1  -4639.951928  1418.3748137  -3.271  0.0015
RULELAW  1  224.245353  1015.6415428  0.221  0.8257
TRANSACC  1  -436.190872  886.28884379  -0.492  0.6238
CS  _Q  1  -22.687917  83.31885992  -0.272  0.7860
CS RL  1  114.021395  53.22280066  2.142  0.0347
CS TR  1  -227.721595  127.13780872  -1.791  0.0765
BQ RL  1  -12.780232  91.01278167  -0.140  0.8886
BQ_TR  1  615.397955  202.32368292  3.042  0.0030
RL_TR  1  -42.317376  158.11101698  -0.268  0.7896
Root  MSE  1824.75678  R-square  0.5057
Dep Mean  5164.86726  Adj  R-sq  0.4111
C.V.  35.33018
Commonwealtb  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  -452.895607  382.93118086  -1.183  0.2408
BUROQUAL  1  5254.212184  1171.1472703  4.486  0.0001
RULELAW  1  -468.920642  423.80782953  -1.106  0.2722
TRANSACC  1  163.736318  506.49678825  0.323  0.7474
CS BQ  1  191.972019  131.22410526  1.463  0.1478
CS  RL  1  34.722242  44.50601864  0.780  0.4378
CS  TR  1  1.627993  55.35947917  0.029  0.9766
BQ_RL  1  -458.742653  301.96176679  -1.519  0.1330
BQ TR  1  -531.473809  276.01717013  -1.926  0.0581
RLhTR  1  186.589566  82.53558230  2.261  0.0268
Root  MSE  804.70311  R-square  0.7055
Dep Mean  3267.06522  Adj  R-sq  0.6329
C.V.  24.63076
35Table  9.
Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regressions  with  Interaction  Terms
Dependent  Variable:  GDPGROW
(Intercept  and time  dummies  not  shown)
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DE  Estimate  Error  Parameter=O  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  1.627397  1.43660416  1.133  0.2587
BUROQUAL  1  -1.704105  3.73886308  -0.456  0.6491
RULELAW  1  -0.032785  2.04271691  -0.016  0.9872
TRANSACC  1  -2.994037  1.54478141  -1.938  0.0541
CS BQ  1  0.488779  0.29916871  1.634  0.1039
CS_RL  1  -0.178825  0.18850139  -0.949  0.3440
CS TR  1  -0.194963  0.27525119  -0.708  0.4796
BQ_RL  1  -0.794963  0.34236056  -2.322  0.0213
BQ_TR  1  0.571126  0.62566211  0.913  0.3625
RL_TR  1  0.502112  0.37220858  1.349  0.1789
Root  MSE  8.04395  R-square  0.4421
Dep Mean  -4.40131  Adj  R-sq  0.3898
C.V.  -182.76242
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  7.765683  3.23820953  2.398  0.0184
BUROQUAL  1  -0.407505  5.22462917  -0.078  0.9380
RULELAW  1  -10.823937  3.68699461  -2.936  0.0041
TRANSACC  1  -7.192029  3.05174037  -2.357  0.0204
CS BQ  1  0.762174  0.29964632  2.544  0.0125
CS RL  1  -0.350388  0.19568747  -1.791  0.0765
CS TR  1  -0.967809  0.44885743  -2.156  0.0335
BQ_RL  1  -0.691493  0.34103421  -2.028  0.0453
BQ_TR  1  0.053790  0.77904298  0.069  0.9451
RL_TR  1  1.968291  0.56710596  3.471  0.0008
Root MSE  6.70112  R-square  0.5291
Dep Mean  -2.20332  Adj  R-sq  0.4426
C.V.  -304.13790
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  7.716033  3.47030349  2.223  0.0292
BUROQUAL  1  -0.122034  10.57792863  -0.012  0.9908
RULELAW  1  6.307698  3.60832986  1.748  0.0845
TRANSACC  1  -13.887164  4.59609468  -3.022  0.0034
CS BQ  1  -0.754559  1.17152745  -0.644  0.5215
CS RL  1  -0.191328  0.40189785  -0.476  0.6354
CS TR  1  -0.726640  0.49493368  -1.468  0.1462
BQRL  1  -6.439742  2.68678657  -2.397  0.0190
BQ TR  1  5.669569  2.51894901  2.251  0.0273
RL_TR  1  0.821198  0.73649432  1.115  0.2684
Root  MSE  7.35158  R-square  0.6522
Dep Mean  -7.13712  Adj  R-sq  0.5688
C.V.  -103.00493
36Table  10.
Ordinary  Least  Squares  Regressions  with  Interaction  Terms
Dependent  Variable:  EOTOT
(Intercept  and time  dummies  not  shown)
Complete  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for  H0:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter-0  Prob  >  |TI
CIVSOC  1  0.845543  0.38747624  2.182  0.0304
BUROQUAL  1  -0.662311  0.96019058  -0.690  0.4912
RULELAW  1  -0.270780  0.49658879  *-0.545  0.5862
TRANSACC  1  0.020864  0.36839227  0.057  0.9549
CS BQ  1  0.062326  0.06418030  0.971  0.3328
CS RL  1  0.071716  0.03508033  2.044  0.0423
CS TR  1  -0.192074  0.06677313  -2.877  0.0045
BQ_RL  1  -0.112732  0.08007834  -1.408  0.1609
BQ  TR  1  0.192005  0.13369687  1.436  0.1527
RL_TR  1  0.055864  0.08518144  0.656  0.5128
Root  MSE  2.04819  R-square  0.2811
Dep Mean  69.89592  Adj  R-sq  0.2108
C.V.  2.93035
Central  and Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T  for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=O  Prob  >  ITI
cIvsoc  1  1.624792  0.80527259  2.018  0.0462
BUROQUAL  1  -1.818506  1.27881495  -1.422  0.1580
RULELAW  1  -1.211079  0.89051982  -1.360  0.1768
TRANSACC  1  -2.000704  0.76575367  -2.613  0.0103
CS_BQ  1  0.110003  0.06439515  1.708  0.0906
CS RL  1  0.074731  0.03524245  2.120  0.0364
CS TR  1  -0.334379  0.10592440  -3.157  0.0021
BQ RL  1  -0.232918  C.07817691  -2.979  0.0036
RQ_TR  1  0.401537  0.17203433  2.334  0.0215
RL_TR  1  0.242268  0.13295301  1.822  0.0713
Root  MSE  1.69755  R-square  0.3208
Dep Mean  70.72471  Adj  R-sq  0.2021
C.V.  2.40022
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for  HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob  >  ITI
CIVSOC  1  0.401742  1.13676677  0.353  0.7250
BUROQUAL  1  -1.583893  3.04325697  -0.520  0.6046
RULELAW  1  1.340484  1.03186075  1.299  0.1987
TRANSACC  1  3.185208  1.23577301  2.578  0.0123
CS  _Q  1  0.263518  0.38215273  0.690  0.4930
CS_RL  1  -0.019031  0.11483952  -0.166  0.8689
CS T_  1  -0.050790  0.14746114  -0.344  0.7317
BQ_RL  1  0.884135  0.73307224  1.206  0.2324
BQ TR  1  -0.868490  0.72173219  -1.203  0.2334
RL_TR  1  -0.465058  0.20774770  -2.239  0.0288
Root MSE  2.03652  R-square  0.3974
Dep  Mean  68.64763  Adi R-sq  0.2224
C.V.  2.96663
37Table 11.
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions  with Interaction  Terms
Dependent  Variable: SESEC
(Intercept  and time dummies not shown)
Complete sample
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > tT(
CIVSOC  1  2.533181  1.88237652  1.346  0.1804
BUROQUAL  1  -9.179177  5.21939174  -1.759  0.0807
RULELAW  1  -7.366038  2.95473279  -2.493  0.0138
TRANSACC  1  -8.374211  1.94960503  -4.295  0.0001
CS BQ  1  0.893582  0.29040893  3.077  0.0025
CS RL  1  -0.139857  0.16670925  -0.839  0.4028
CS_TR  1  -0.403442  0.33274220  -1.212  0.2272
BQ RL  1  -0.193849  0.39687678  -0.488  0.6260
BQ TR  1  0.339095  0.68994875  0.491  0.6238
RL_TR  1  1.436430  0.47476691  3.026  0.0029
Root MSE  9.19882  R-square  0.4889
Dep Mean  85.78869  Adj R-sq  0.4310
C.V.  10.72265
Central and  Eastern  Europe  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > ITI
CIVSOC  1  0.054826  5.97750838  0.009  0.9927
BUROQUAL  1  -16.320885  11.61949208  -1.405  0.1638
RULELAW  1  -4.707140  8.65088050  -0.544  0.5878
TRANSACC  1  -6.855584  5.26668682  -1.302  0.1965
CS BQ  1  0.765097  0.41475368  1.845  0.0686
CS RL  1  -0.068653  0.22477216  -0.305  0.7608
CS TR  1  -0.014088  0.79666740  -0.018  0.9859
BQsRL  1  -0.159851  0.52346667  -0.305  0.7608
HO TR  1  1.176155  1.50502126  0.781  0.4367
RL TR  1  1.002874  1.19510617  0.839  0.4037
Root MSE  10.76488  R-square  0.4984
Dep Mean  83.15146  Adj R-sq  0.3981
C.V.  12.94611
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  sample
Parameter  Standard  T for HO:
Variable  DF  Estimate  Error  Parameter=0  Prob > ITI
CIVSOC  1  -1.140769  2.82984695  -0.403  0.6887
BUROQUAL  1  14.675893  13.86464119  1.059  0.2952
RULELAW  1  2.133720  5.23926280  0.407  0.6857
TRANSACC  1  -4.684670  4.22153515  -1.110  0.2728
CS_BQ  1  1.585933  0.92593979  1.713  0.0933
CS RL  1  -0.123204  0.32995876  -0.373  0.7105
CS TR  1  0.030179  0.42974955  0.070  0.9443
BQ_RL  1  -4.727513  3.43271010  -1.377  0.1750
BQ TR  1  0.389957  2.12946305  0.183  0.8555
RL_TR  1  0.503983  0.76832447  0.656  0.5151
Root MSE  4.82422  R-square  0.6731
Dep Mean  89.96769  Adj R-sq  0.5548
C.V.  5.36217
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